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1989, a crucial year for most of central and eastern Europe, 
brought convulsive change to the Bulgarian agricultural sector. 
Bulgaria's centrally planned economy, under the direction of the 
national and ultimately the Soviet Communist Party, collapsed. 
Bulgarian agriculture was forced to address the question - "Do we 
privatize this industry and if so when and how?" Bulgaria chose a 
unique path to private agriculture. 
Agricultural Foundation 
Bulgaria has a total land area of approximately 47,000 square miles 
(Ohio has 41,000). There are about 10 million acres of cropland in 
both Bulgaria and Ohio. The mix,however, is different because of 
climatic and topographical differences. Corn and soybeans are the 
major crops in Ohio.wsi1~ fmall grains dominate the landscape of 
rural Bulgaria. Much of the cultivated land in Bulgaria is rolling 
hill land. In Ohio this type of land has reverted to pasture 
and/or trees. Large productive river valleys in central and 
northern Bulgaria are in the 100 to 300 foot elevation range and 
the highest points in the country Z exceed 10, 000 
elevation of Ohio ranges between ~~nd 1600 feet. 
feet. The 
Bulgaria is 
essentially at the same latitude as Ohio, but the climate is quite 
different, particularly during the growing season. Most moisture 
comes during the fall, winter, and spring. Very little rainfall 
comes during the summer growing months. A dry mediterranean summer 
necessitates irrigation if summer grains, fruits and vegetables are 
to be grown successfully in Bulgaria. 
Farm History 
At the end of World War II nearly 2/3's of Bulgarian labor worked 
~ 
on extended-family farms that averag~ less than 50 acres each. 
Peasant agriculture, except for remnants of feudal estates in 
northeastern Bulgaria, dominated the scene. Farming methods were 
rudimentary, relying mostly on hand and animal power. Most land 
was privately owned with recorded deeds. Farmers were productive 
and knew how to earn a living from small-scale agriculture. They 
were technically competent and exported management and production 
skills. Neighboring Balkan and central European countries 
traditionally looked to ''Bulgarian Gardeners" for instruction and 
demonstration on successful small-farm agriculture. 
1946 saw the beginning of forced collectivization under the new 
Bulgarian communist government, with enactment of the Agrarian 
Reform Law. Land ownership was limited to approximately 75 acres 
in the mountainous areas and 50 acres in the valleys. The rest was 
expropriated. Farmers were "encouraged" to pool their land and 
other assets into community "cooperative farms~ By the mid-1950' s 
"voluntary pooling" was replaced by "forced cooperatio~ Typical 
villages operated 1500 to 2000 acre cooperative farms. Landowners 
·' 
received rent for the land they contributed to the community farm. 
Other assets such as livestock, feed, and equipment were simply 
donated to the co-op, duly recorded however. 
Beginning in the mid-1960's, several villages were grouped into 
larger operating units. Rents for land "brought" to the co-ops 
were discontinued and farmers became "state employees." The larger 
production units continued to be combined into yet larger units, 
gradually increasing to 50,000 acres. By the 1970's some of the 
largest agro-industrial complexes (TKZC' s) had reached 250, 000 
acres. Large scale animal production centers associated with each 
TKZC replaced the small livestock enterprises maintained by each 
farm family in the past. Large fields were organized<1J.ec@ssary to 
permit use of high capacity modern machinery. Small-scale 
agriculture was a thing of the past. As ~generations past, 
those working on the farms lost the store of small-farm experience 
and knowledge that came with the early "cooperators." The farm 
labor force changed from "true farmers" to part-time, seasonal, 
retired state employees and forced labor brigades, with less than 
a personal interest in the physical or financial success of the 
farm. 
In November of 1989, the communist dictator who had controlled 
Bulgaria for 35 years was ousted from power. Free elections in the 
spring 1990 replaced the Party with a democratic Parliament. The 
new government continues to evolve toward a less socialistic 
stance, al though slower than western advisors would like. A 
multitude of hastily formulated laws were enacted to facilitate 
market reforms deemed necessary to move Bulgaria toward 
privatization. Land reform was one of those laws. 
The Land Law 
Land is a special commodity in the hearts and minds of Bulgarians. 
;ii.J..e,;wj is limited but remember there is more land, even more tillable 
land, per person in Bulgaria than in Ohio. The long history of 
Bulgaria, counted in millennia, creates a sense and meaning of land 
ownership difficult for most Americans to associate with. The 
attachment is largely emotional. Other than family and possibly 
education, there is little that has more value than ancestral land. 
It was important, politically and socially to deal with the land 
question very early in the transformation period. 
Early in 1991, less than a year after installing the new 
government, the land issue was addressed. The Law for Land 
Ownership and Use was passed. A series of amendments were enacted 
a year later, removing many of the initial restrictions on land 
transfer and use. TKZC's were to be abolished and assets were 
returned to individual claimants. The core provision of the law 
required that land be returned to original owners, or their heirs, 
as defined by the 1946 Agrarian Reform Law. Herein Bulgaria goes 
back to its future. 
Land is being restituted, if possible, within the "real (actual 
1946) boundaries". The small dispersed fields of 1946 are now 
likely split by one or two more generations of "new owners" and 
property comes to a new owner through marriages that combine 
ownership from a wide geographic area. Let's look at a 
representative real situation, that of Stoichko Georgiev 
Chevenyachki, a "new" Bulgarian farmer. 
A Real Situation 
Stoichko's land is located near his ancestral village of Pastoohe. 
He is ex-mayor of the village but lives and works as a teacher in 
the near-by city · of Stanke Dimitrov. His portion of his 
grandfathers'~n 14~ifferent parcels) ~as been 
restituted (retitled) to him. None of the parcels is next to the 
another. 
1.98 acres 2.47 acres .25 acres 
.62 acres .74 acres .12 acres 
.62 acres .12 acres .49 acres 
.05 acres .67 acres .49·acres 
.07 acres .99 acres 
The fundamental question that Stoichko and others like him have is 
- "What do I do with this land?" Multiple concerns are imbedded in 
this basic question. First, and most obvious to Stoichko, is 
deciding what to plant on his recently restituted land. Second, 
and of great concern, is how much to produce. Beyond Stoichko's 
concern to produce enough food for his family, is where and how to 
sell excess production. Organized markets, for the most part, are 
a thing of the past. Third, and fundamentally more difficult to 
answer, is how to produce. The art and science of small-scale 
agriculture has largely been lost through attrition. Beyond the 
lack of capital to purchase traditional inputs (fertilizer,seeds, 
chemicals, and machinery) is the lack of training and experience in 
proper use. Technologies that TKZC agronomists and managers were 
trained to use, upon which farm production systems were dependent, 
are for the most part not available to new farmers like Stoichko. 
Modern technology on the new farm is limited. Farmers are not only 
faced with returning to small-scale production but to the 
production methods of their grandfathers. Fourth, Stoichko 
struggles with how to combine his fields into larger more efficient 
units. 
The Opportunity 
Today's global marketplace and recently completed GATT and NAFTA 
agreements have focused national thinking on the movement of labor, 
capital, and hard goods in the trade arena. We have overlooked our 
most sought after commodity - EDUCATION. Developing economies, now 
more particularly those of Eastern Europe and others emerging from 
the shackles of communism, just can't get enough of this U.S. prod-
uct. The preference for a U.S. education is clear, not withsta-
nding the long history of academic excellence in Western Europe. 
It is not just the store of knowledge and experience at our 
universities that is so desired, but it's form and substance. 
The propensity of our American education system to focus upon 
people where they live, forces it to deal with everyday problems, 
large and small, and make it responsive to the needs of people. 
People endeavoring to improve their socio-economic well-being by 
better utilization of what they have, including of course their 
most valuable asset themselves. The success of our great Land-
Grant and Extension Institutions, founded on this very principle, 
is testamentary evidence of what the world wants most from the U.S. 
The form and substance of U.S. extension education is world renown. 
It helped American agriculture address and solve uncountable 
problems during its transition from subsistence to a commercial 
agriculture that is the envy the world. Its form, beginning with 
a problem of people, subjecting the problem to research and 
scientific methodology, developing and delivering a research-based 
educational program to address the problem, and following up with 
impact assessments, is what "transition" economies need and want. 
;JI' Much of the physical science substance needed for effective 
extension education in Bulgaria already exists. The underlying 
substance of economic principles to implement "management" thinking 
and the use~ducational methodology appropriate to teach non-
traditional students how to solve problems is, for the most part, 
missing. U.S. style extension education has demonstrated a 
masterful ability to do both. 
Challenge for Extension 
The question is not "Why or should U.S. Extension be in Bulgaria?" 
That question has been answered. "We hereby offer the services of 
the Land Grant institutions and their nationwide staffs and 
experience in research, teaching, and extension as a solution to 
the troubled areas of the world in their quest for more and better 
food, and better clothing and housing for their people." A quote 
from John A. Hannah, president, Michigan State College and 
president, Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, in 
a letter to President Harry S. Truman. 
why. How can we help Stoichko? 
The question is how, not 
The "how" question, with respect to Bulgaria, was answered by an 
agreement between the Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and the 
USDA Extension Service/International Programs office, in the form 
of the Bulgarian/American Extension Project. It was funded to 
assist the Bulgarian agricultural community with the many questions 
associated with "privatizing" Bulgarian agriculture. The project 
had two broad objectives: 1) to demonstrate, through action, what 
a "U.S. style'' extension organization could be and do in Bulgaria 
and 2) to help farmers and agri-business managers understand and 
apply 11 free-market" economic principles as they adjust to their new 
economic environment. 
Three teams of two American Extension Advisors, arriving in 
Bulgaria in April 1993, were strategically located throughout the 
country. One team, stationed in Plovdiv, the heartland of central 
valley agriculture, worked intensively with farmers and agri-
businesses "privatizing" cooperative vegetable production and 
marketing. The second team, located in Gorno Oryakhovitsa, a 
center of Danubian plain agriculture in north central Bulgaria, 
worked closely in privatizing seed and fruit producers and 
processors. A third team was positioned in Kyustendil to assist 
with problems encountered in privatizing mountain/valley fruit 
production in western Bulgaria. Each U.S. team consisted of a 
qualified experienced county agent and an equally qualified state 
extension specialist. County agent team members came from 
Kentucky, Florida, and Michigan. State specialists came from 
Arkansas, Ohio, and North Carolina. U.S. advisors worked 
collaboratively with a Bulgarian counterpart team at respective 
locations. 
The challenge each joint team faced, in it's broadest definition, 
was to develop and deliver an effective extension education program 
that would assist local decision-makers with a "real" problem in 
their community. After listening intently to farmers, agri-
business managers, liquidation committees, researchers, educators, 
and government officials it became apparent to the Kyustendil team 
that its challenge was to effectively address the land problem. 
,(ff Stoichko's problem was real, it was serious, and nearly everyone 
had the same problem. Assisting with solution and understanding 
would enable the team to demonstrate effective extension education 
and improve decision-makers' understanding and use of free-market 
... 
economic principles. The other teams addressed equally serious 
issues at their respective locations. The Kyustendil team 
consisted of Allan Lines (state specialist - Ohio), Larry Halsey 
(county agent - Florida), Snejana Saeva (economist - Kyustendil), 
Veslava Popova (interpreter - Kyustedil), and Iliana ?????????? 
(coordinator - Kyustendil) . 
Addressing Stoichko's Problem 
The arduous problem identification process focused the team on 
specific aspects of the larger problem to allow for an effective 
extension education program. Underneath Stoichko's inability to 
deal with many his questions was an lack of fundamental enterprise 
budgeting and asset valuation skills. Both were sorely needed to 
enable him to find solutions to his problems. The Bulgarian team 
members were deficit in these skills, as well. Economic efficiency 
and profit were not part of the Bulgarian lexicon. The training 
program would also serve to leave a trained counterpart team in 
place to continue the educational program. 
The foundation for the extension education program was the 
development of enterprise budgets using "western" economic 
principles. A clear understanding of variable, fixed, cash, non-
cash, and opportunity costs was fundamental to the success of the 
program and would go a long way to help Stoichko solve his problem. 
The most difficult element of the budgeting exercise was the 
collection of "representative" yield, input, and price data. 
• 
1f1 Reliable research data on small farm agriculture was non-existent. 
Credible estimates were garnered and verified from traditional 
extension sources practicing new farmers, experienced 
agronomists, educators, researchers, and the agri-business 
community. Bulgarian team members resisted at first, but soon 
eagerly adopted extension's model of collecting, verifying, and 
using data from the "real world" for economic decision-making. 
Weaning themselves from "official" data for economic planning was 
a major step forward for the Bulgarians. 
The second budgeting challenge dealt with fixed costs. 
Identification and determination of fixed costs from a "private" 
perspective was eye-opening for the Bulgarians. In the past, fixed 
costs were "public" costs that never entered into the "production" 
decisions. The extension team, again with a great deal of 
assistance, was able to generate reasonable estimates of fixed 
costs for enterprises being considered. Learning how and when to 
correctly include fixed costs in private profit oriented short and 
long run decisions was new thinking in Bulgaria. This new skill 
improved Stoichko's ability to address his problems. 
The budgeting exercise added a completely new economic concept, 
opportunity cost, into Bulgarian economic problem solving process. 
Generally accepted economic thinking included only items that money 
was spent on. The idea of charging oneself for the use of self-
supplied, owned, equity, or alternative use resources was 
completely foreign. Interest on loans was included but the 
, 
"opportunity cost" of using one's own money and assets was not part 
of the equation. Inclusion of this concept was critical if 
Stoichko and others were to be able to successfully address the 
land fragmentation problem created by the new law. 
Before Stoichko and others can address the fragmented land problem, 
some sense of land value is necessary. At village meetings farmers 
would often say, "I would like to rent the field next me but the 
owner wants too much money." Risk-based total cost budgeting, an 
integral part production and marketing decisions, facilitated 
discussions between neighboring new land owners about the 
"economic" rather than "emotional" value of farmland. Being able 
to calculate a reasonable land rent, and more importantly 
understanding how to do it, was a necessary first step for 
improving economic efficiency by combining small fields. 
Reasonable rent calculations provided a foundation for establishing 
an value for farmland that was derivedA~~onomics of production 
rather than from emotional attachment. When asked, landowners 
would often say they wouldn't sell their land for less than 100,000 
levs per dekar ($15,000 per acre) or rent it to a neighbor for less 
than 1000 levs per dekar ($145 per acre) . The extension education 
program described above helped Stoichko and others realize that 
free-market economic values were closer to $30 (rent) and $600 
(sale) per acre. It helped separate emotions and economics in 
the embryonic, if not non-existent, Bulgarian land market. It 
helped Bulgarian agriculture find its future through its past. 
